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e.g.,
the tangelo and the mule. [2]
Of
course, biotechnology now allows us to inter
mingle species which differ far rrore than the
horse and the donkey, but this is a differ
ence in degree (an "extension," as I said) •
(b) It also seems to me that the changes we
have made within species by traditional :ne
thods differ from the creation of hybrids
only in degree.
In all such cases, humans
have intentionally altered the genetiG make
up of animals.
My point was--and is--that
the alteration of non-human (or human) gene
tic make-up by humans, by whatever technolo
gy, is not in itself wrong. It becomes wrong
when sentient individuals are treated as mere
means to our ends.

In my recent article, "an the Genetic
Manipllation of Animals, "[ 1] I argued that
although current genetic experiments on sen
tient non-human anirrals (hereafter, simply
"anirrals") <ire ethically very questionable,
it does not follow that genetic manipllation
of animals is in principle wrong.
If such
manipllation were m::>tivated by a thorough
going, responsible respect and concern for
sentient individuals, I held, it could be
m::>rally justifiable.
While Michael W. Fox
has disagreed with sane of my contentions, at
bottom we agree far m::>re than we disagree. I
am pleased to have the opportunity here to
respond to him in turn.

It is at this point that the one serious
disagreement between myself and Fox emerges.
He presses the following, third objection,
according to which any alteration of genetic
make-up would be unjustified: such tarrpering
shows a disregard for the "telos" of animal
species, and this is wrong because their
"telos" is "to be respected and [is] worthy
of m::>ral consideration." This is an inter
esting and important challenge, but I will
argue that it does not show genetic maniplla
tion to be unjustifiable.

Fox first takes issue with my claim that
genetic manipllation is "not in itself cruel,
nor need it lead to cruelty" [po 14] •
He
quite righUy points out that experimentation
on animals, in particular transgenic experi
mentation (in which genes f'ran one species
are inserted into another), when done plrely
for human benefit, is very likely to result
in cruelty to animal subjects.
I entirely
agree with him here, but to do so is no
departure fran my original contention.
My
point was that genetic manipllation as such
is not the culprit.
Genetic manipllation
m::>tivated by respect and concern for sentient
individuals would probably not result in
cruelty [see my p. 14].

As Fox notes, the concept of "telos" is
Aristotelian in origin, meaning (roughly)
"final cause" or purpose. Al
Although
though Fox urges
us to grasp "the full and original meaning of
'telos'," this is precisely what we would do
well to avoid. AristoUe's "telos" is wedded
to the anti
anti-evolutionary
-evolutionary view that species
are fixed, inmutable, governed by intrinsic
p.rrposes.
If we are to use the concept at
all, we must up-date it as, e.g., Bernard

Fox's second disagreement is with my
claim that "genetic farming" is simply an
extension of the traditional human maniplla
tion of animal species for our own conveni
conveni
ence [po 13].
Fox claims that transgenic
experiments are a different matter altoge
ther, because "never before has it been pos
sible to cross the genetic boundaries that
keep individual species separate. I have two
responses to make.
(a) surely we have
crossed these boundaries before.
Consider,
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manipIlation.
est:i.ma.
kind of genetic rranipllation.
It is est:ima.
ted that 1986 will be the year in which
scientists will try to use genetic engineer
ing to correct genetic defects in humans. [7]
"Good" (although in a sense alien) genetic
material
material will be substituted for~~"defective"
for~~"defective"
material.
We could easily describe this
procedure as a restoration of "telos:" i.e.,
the person will be allowed to have the gene
tic make-up he or she would have had if
"errors,"" as scientists put it, had not oc
"errors,
curred.
And haven't we altered the "telos"
of an:ima.ls
animals by danestication?
As I suggested
originally, one might "rectify" this through
genetic engineering [po 14] • As I also sug
gested, we might re-introduce extinct species
(as well as preserve· endangered
endanger.ed ones) with
the help of genetic (including transgenic)
manipulation, and this, too, can be seen as
serving "telos." All things considered, the
concept of "telos" is not very helpful to the
opponent of genetic manipulation.

Rollin has suggested:
the "telos" of a liv
said to be its genetically
genetically
ing thing could be said
encoded nature. [3] Fox follows this sugges
tion when he identifies "telos" with "the
unique genetic make-up of species."
However, the up-dating of the concept of
"telos" which we are required to make renders
it rather unsuitable for use by opponents of
manipIlation. The genetic make-up of
genetic manipllation.
an animal species is subject to alteration-
sometimes gradual,
sometimes radical (as
ell'olutionary
biologists
now increasingly be
evolutionary
lieve) •
Chance and natural
naturdl selection shape
the "telos" of animals, keeping it fran being
infl8}dble pattern. Humans also shape the
an inflexible
"telos" of animals, by "artificial" selection
and by alteration of the conditions for
surll'ival. The only difference between
animal survival.
hUllan and the non-human contributions to
the human
animal "telos" is that the former is general
ly deliberate.
It does not seem reasonable
to condemn any intentional contribution to
evolution while accepting all chance contri
buUons (regardless of the considerable suf
butions
fering the latter cause). Instead, we should
condemn ill-intentioned and
irresponsible
contributions--and consider applauding re
sponsible attempts to alleviate the suffering
caused by chance (e.g., by correcting genetic
defects responsible for thousands of di
seases) •
~ i,

However, it seems plain that, despite
his earlier words, Fox does not genuinely
believe that altering an individual's genetic
make-up is wrong in itself.
Towards the end
of his response, he endorses "appropriate"
genetic engineering, defined by him as moti
noti
vated by "ecological forethought, humility,
I couldn't
and compassion.
o::xnpassion. "
couldn •t agree more.
Although Fox, in his fourth and last objec
tion, says that II fail to address the need
for such a "world-view," I did in fact re
peatedly urge that concern and respect for
(at least) sentient individuals, in conjunc
tion
with extrema
extrem= caution and humility,
should guide every act of genetic manipula
rranifUla
tion.
sadly, very little concern in this
regard has been extended to non-humans.
I
think Fox would join me in hoping that this
will one day change. [8]

M:lreover,
MJreover, it is far from clear that
"telos" (in the post-Darwinian sense) is
morally
It is plausible to
norally considerable.
hold that sentient beings are morally consi
derable because they have interests.
Their
genetic make-up certainly sets the boundaries
of those interests, but that does not mean
that it--as opposed to the interests--is
morally
Rollin, for example,
norally considerable.
is driven to reject the moral considerability
of "telos." Although he at one point sug
gests that genetically encoded "telos" is
"deserving of moral
noral concern," [4] he denies
that plants (which, of course, have their
"telos" ) are morally considerable, because
they lack interests, [5] concluding that "any
living thing, E.! so far as it evidences in
terests •• •
• •• is worthy of moral concern."
[6]
concern."[6]
Perhaps this is mistaken, .;md a case could be
made
rrade for the moral
noral considerability of every
thing with "telos,
"telos,"II but it is not at all
clear that this could be done.

Notes
1. Between th~ Species 1/3 (1985), pp.
13-8. Subsequent references will be inserted
parenthetically into the text.

2. The saga of the mule now has a
fascinating new
ChrOllOsomal
Ilew twist.
Chrorrosamal analysis
shows that a foal which resulted from the
already extremely rare fruitful mating of a
mule and a jack donkey is part
prrt mule, part
horse, and part
prrt donkey. "Dragon Foal," born
in China in 1981, is b'1ought
tt'IDught to have a high
probability of being fertile. If she is, she
may be the first of a new species.
All this

Finally, i f one wished (although II do
not), one could actually make a good.
good case in
tenns of post-Darwinian "telos" for certain
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came about by traditional means. See "Dragon
Foal:
Is This the Birth of a New Species?,"
Discover (January, 1986), pp. 12-14.
3. Animal Rights and HWTBI1 J'i:Orality
(Buffalo:
Prometheus Books, 1981), pp. 54,
52.
However, I have my doubts about the
advisability of continuing to use this term
in arguments with scientis:ts. It is too easy
to confuse the new meaning with the original
sense.
The hostility these scientists show
when they discuss "telos," as Fox documents,
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is hardly surprising.
4.

Ibid.; p. 55.

5.

Ibid., p. 42.

6.

Ibid., P. 43, emphasis added.

7. S~, e.g., IOU. S. Panel Approves
Gene Transplant Guide, UPI Report, Pittsburgh
~ (9/24/85), p. l~ and "The Genetic Gam
ble," ~ (1985, televised by T,oiQED, Pitts
b.rrgh, on 11/26/85) •
The first procedure
will be tried on those born without function
ing immune systems.
8. Here is an example of a piece of
genetic engineering which could develop into
something highly appropriate. Bacteria, fun
gi, and yeasts can now be m:xlified in such a
way as to constitute food indistinguishable
fran meats in looks, texture, taste, and
nutrition.
(See "Food of the Future," Sci
ence Diges1,: (December, 1985), p. 22.) This
food can be grown easily in tanks in any
lCY'...ation.
The
benefits for humans
L1'l
drought-stricken countries is obvious (and, I
might add, this will apply to much of the
U.S. in the next century, if the "greenhouse
effect" predictions prove to be correct).
Much animal suffering--although, predictably,
the scientists involved in these experiments
make no mention of this--could be prevente:1
by this technique.
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